Author: Andrei Kalitin
According to the Federal Research Sociological Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS), whose report is titled “How Are You Living, Russia?”, the foundation of the country’s stable development has become the “limited-consumption class.” This social group accounts for 62% of the population.
The “limited-consumption class” comprises people whose incomes allow them to meet basic needs (food, clothing, housing and utilities). They have no savings, and can purchase big-ticket items (household appliances, a private vehicle) only on credit. This “limited-consumption class” has nothing in common with the middle class (in the conventional sense), which thinks about investments, savings, children’s education, medical care, and financial independence. In Russia, nearly two-thirds of people live paycheck to paycheck, and the vast majority—on credit.
The “limited-consumption class” is oriented toward working exclusively for the state and in the state’s interests. It forms the social core that cements Russia’s political system. The public sector pays these people, and their wages are rising. What matters to them is not living better than yesterday, but at least not worse. This frame of reference has a political corollary: a socially active middle class and private business are accustomed to presenting political claims to the authorities, regarding competition, private property, freedoms, and public debate as necessary conditions for growth. The “limited-consumption class,” living in a credit-and-paycheck mode, does not argue with the state. It simply listens and eats.
RAS sociologists note that the demand for reform of the political system and for an internal discussion about the country’s future has simply disappeared. The majority of this credit-and-paycheck stratum view the established order positively. But this is not support for the course—it is loyalty underwritten by finances.
The share of the limited-consumption class in society has largely grown due to a reduction in poverty: whereas in the early 1990s, 16% lacked enough for food, by 2025 it is just 3%. Limited consumption has become a step forward for the poorest segments of the population. The SVO (Russia’s “special military operation”) did not worsen their financial situation—quite the opposite.
The steady growth of the “limited-consumption class” will require the state to increase budget expenditures, which will be exchanged for silence, loyalty, and electoral support for any initiatives, including prohibitive and repressive measures. Tightening belts and turning the screws do not directly affect limited consumption.
In this matrix there is no place for the values that underpinned the middle class and powered growth in the 2000s: political competition is suppressed, private initiative is dangerous, debate is risky. A society of “limited consumption” can be governed by a similarly limited set of instruments: fear, prohibitions, and wages. The problem is singular: such a society is concerned exclusively with satisfying credit-and-food needs. Under this scenario, the country’s growth and development are simply ruled out.
