Why these two cases matter in Moscow
Russian elites are watching developments in Iran and Venezuela with unusual attention, treating both countries as possible models for how ruling groups behave under mounting external pressure and deepening internal crisis. These cases are being studied through the lens of risks, costs, and long-term prospects — and, inevitably, measured against Russia’s own future.
In public, such comparisons are generally considered unwelcome. The conventional line is that Russia’s political system has a far greater запас прочности — a much deeper reserve of resilience, resources, and institutional capacity — than either Iran or Venezuela. For that reason, it is not customary to speak openly about a possible systemic crisis in Russia, let alone its rapid decline. And yet the parallels arise on their own.
An important source of reassurance for the Russian establishment is the country’s nuclear arsenal. It is widely assumed that nuclear weapons make external pressure on Russia impossible on anything resembling the Venezuelan or Iranian model. At the same time, that same factor is believed to increase the responsibility of the elites and to make any future transition more likely to unfold in a controlled, non-revolutionary way.
Two models: negotiated adaptation or closed mobilization
As one political strategist put it, “This year we have seen a fork in the road between two models.”
The first is the Venezuelan model. In this reading, it means an intra-elite agreement to replace the regime’s leader, a turn toward liberalization with the participation of the existing elites, and an adaptive transition period in which the regime changes gradually rather than through a sudden destruction of institutions and procedures. The current Venezuelan system, in this interpretation, offers openness and dialogue with the West in exchange for abandoning its previous foreign-policy course. One of the key conditions of this model is access to oil revenues and the preservation of business assets. Its weak point, however, is that the outcome remains unclear: it is still too early to know how the process will end or what price will ultimately be paid.
“The other model is the Iranian one,” the strategist said. “The Iranian model means power controlled by the security services, the full mobilization of society, and a transition to a closed, semi-clandestine form of rule. The strategy of this model is the literal physical survival of the elites. Think of it as a state-order that wages struggle both against the outside world and against its own domestic opponents or dissenters. It is a system defined by total closure and a conspiratorial style of power.”
The survival strategies of elites in these two countries differ sharply. But in both cases there is still no final outcome, which makes it difficult to judge objectively how effective either model really is.
What these scenarios mean for Russia
Within Russia’s security establishment, the Venezuelan scenario is viewed very negatively. It is seen as an example of how elites may sacrifice their leader — and other key members of the ruling circle — in order to preserve their own positions and ensure their political survival. What remains unclear is how widely this view is shared across the broader elite, especially among business groups and the civilian bureaucracy. Russian history suggests that elites in Russia more often choose compromise than insist on going to the bitter end.
Debates of this kind may also intensify suspicion within the ruling class. Any hint of possible “loyalty to the West” or readiness for compromise can be interpreted as potential betrayal, creating fertile ground for intra-elite conflict and repression.
The Iranian model, by contrast, might seem more ideologically attractive to some. Yet within the security camp, the civilian bureaucracy, and the business class, the Iranian regime is often perceived in aesthetic and political terms as fundamentally unattractive.
In Iran, a system of dual power has effectively taken shape: a significant share of resources and real influence is concentrated in the hands of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps — a security structure that resembles an order-state — while civilian institutions retain a largely subordinate role. This arrangement is reinforced by a religious ideology and by the doctrine of an “economy of resistance,” which assumes long-term survival under sanctions and external pressure.
In recent years, a number of right-wing ideologues — above all Alexander Dugin — have promoted the idea that Russia must become more autonomous from the outside world and be prepared to live under prolonged confrontation with the West. Within that framework, the notion of a “besieged fortress” appears entirely organic.
At the same time, developments in Iran and Venezuela are pushing Russian elites to follow these processes with close and sustained interest. For them, these are not just foreign cases. They are objects of internal reflection — and possibly previews of a future choice about Russia’s own model of elite behavior.
