By Sergey Belanovsky, sociologist
For many months now, there has been ongoing debate about what awaits Russia after the end of the “special military operation” (SMO) and, more broadly, after the eventual departure of President Putin. The future remains shrouded in uncertainty, but I will nonetheless share my perspective.
Ideas of economic liberalism, democracy, and human rights currently have no real base—neither among the population nor within the elite. These are marginal viewpoints, unlikely to influence anything in the foreseeable future. The continued discussion of such ideas within opposition circles, especially among political exiles, seems increasingly disconnected from reality.
Technocracy: A Rational Hope
The most optimistic scenario for Russia’s future is the rise of a technocratic government—a regime guided by technocratic principles. For clarity, I must note: even Kim Jong-un is a technocrat, perhaps a highly effective one. I would not call him “bloody”; he inherited a flawlessly calibrated system of terrorist governance and makes full use of it. Dismantling such a system would be unwise and dangerous.
The psychological portrait of a technocrat includes a high level of education, clear thinking, proven business acumen, and outstanding technical competence. Ideally, we’re talking about someone akin to Elon Musk.
A technocrat genuinely values economic development, celebrates technical innovation, and supports scientific progress. In many cases, this passion outweighs their personal ambition—though of course, personal gain is not overlooked. Musk is not indifferent to profit, but the idea of reaching Mars is a higher motivation for him.
A technocrat also respects what might be called the norms of modern society—above all, law and order, and in the Western model, political freedoms. Arbitrary arrests of opposition figures, especially on absurd pretexts, strike them as deeply improper.
At the same time, a technocrat sees no grave sin in lobbying for their own interests or bypassing laws when necessary. For them, results come first. If needed, they can take harsh measures—though only when absolutely necessary. Their decisions are grounded in rational calculation. They are not devoid of mercy. Still, we must remember: Bashar al-Assad is also a technocrat—albeit a failed one. The spiral of violence can also engulf a technocrat.
Technocrats generally view the SMO as a strategic mistake. They want it to end—with minimal losses and, ideally, some tangible gain (Crimea, for example, could be such a gain). They believe the war should not have been launched, but since it’s underway, it must be waged efficiently. Russia’s achievements in weapons production are, in their view, a clear success of technocratic governance. The use of human wave tactics is unpleasant—but “there is no other army for you.”
Culturally, Russian technocrats are Westernizers. They understand that technological progress comes from the West and that Western societal standards represent a functional model. They can work effectively with China but are better than others at recognizing it as a separate civilization. They know cooperation with China cannot replace lost ties with the West. At the first opportunity, a technocrat will seek to restore relations with the West.
Technocrats are, without doubt, the best Russia has to offer. If their influence within the government grows, that would be the best-case scenario. The Russian cabinet is a largely technocratic body, though its power is limited. Nevertheless, it is an influential institution. Even opposition-leaning experts often give the cabinet high marks for competence.
The Russian opposition should support technocrats. I write this slogan half in jest. Technocrats do not need support from a marginal opposition—and in any case, it’s unclear how such support would be meaningful.
Technocrats are not a political party but rather a sphere of influence. However, they are capable of shifting the decision-making balance in a rational direction—though not always successfully.
Their natural antagonists are ideocrats and corruptionists. Ideocrats are people who prioritize political ideas above rational reasoning. Hitler and Stalin were such figures: capable of strategic rationality, but only in service of their ideological missions.
Contemporary Russian power is dominated by an ideocratic agenda—namely, the revival of Russian greatness, which drives the SMO. This idea will likely persist even after the war ends, especially through military production and foreign policy. Yet the Soviet Union’s negative experience gives technocrats leverage to argue for balance and caution.
Corruptionists, unlike technocrats and ideocrats, lack ideology. They act solely in their own interest. Though they wield powerful lobbying tools, they pursue no higher goals. Exploiting the state’s disintegration and the breakdown of legal order, they operate with cynical and often criminal methods. While technocrats, when lobbying, can still deliver meaningful results, corruptionists generally fail—yet often go unpunished.
There is no hard line between technocrats, ideocrats, and corruptionists. These are points on a spectrum, and individuals can drift between them. Technocrats are often partly ideocratic or corrupt. The balance of influence between these groups is dynamic. A relatively favorable scenario for Russia would involve a strengthening of the technocratic worldview among the elite and in the policies they implement.
Technocrats theoretically support economic liberalism, but in practice they often rely on strong administrative action when necessary (as Nabiullina does). Still, ideology is not meaningless to them. Without urgent cause, they try not to betray their principles.
They also believe in the rule of law—up to the point where force becomes necessary. As for democracy, many technocrats fear the rise of populist movements, and not without reason: there are no meaningful ideological counterweights left (the others have been marginalized). However, based on my focus group with big business representatives in 2018, technocrats appear willing to support ideas like municipal self-governance, akin to the old zemstvo system.
A country ruled by rational technocrats can achieve impressive results—China is a clear example. This scenario offers a narrow but real chance for Russia.
Technocrats are not deaf to the ideals of law and even democracy. This could open a window of opportunity for the more reasonable elements of the opposition. But if the opposition wants to be taken seriously by technocrats, it must first become serious itself.
The technocratic component of the Russian elite’s worldview will always be present. Without it, the country will rapidly decay. The fight against national degradation is one of the core motivators for technocrats. Sadly, it is not the only factor influencing decisions—hence, the future remains, to a large extent, in the shadows.
