The prolonged Special Military Operation (SMO) has radically transformed Russia’s socio-criminal landscape, according to a scholarly publication by V. Maslov, a researcher at the Ural Law Institute of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Over three and a half years of conflict have generated a substantial body of data, allowing for the assessment of potential risks associated with the demobilization of combat veterans.
Participation in hostilities — especially under amnesty programs or through the recruitment of convicts — has a direct and lasting impact on the country’s criminal environment. The decision to enlist prisoners, while prompted by a shortage of manpower at the time, was inspired more by historical precedents from World War II than by strategic calculation. In retrospect, this choice appears to be a misstep with long-term consequences.
Already, authorities are registering a noticeable increase in crime committed by SMO veterans, including violent offenses. According to Interior Ministry estimates, this trend has the potential to escalate further — particularly in the event of a rapid and large-scale demobilization.
PTSD, Arms, and Isolation: A Volatile Combination
Key contributing factors include:
- Desocialization and the erosion of stable social ties among former inmates who participated in combat;
- Widespread post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD): symptoms of PTSD are observed in at least 20–30% of those returning from the front lines;
- Combat training: proficiency with weapons acquired during the war, when combined with PTSD or a criminal background, dramatically raises the risk of violent behavior in civilian life;
- Illegal arms circulation, which could become widespread once the conflict ends.
In this context, the anticipated surge in both violent and property crime following the conclusion of the SMO is seen by experts as not only probable but nearly inevitable.
The war has enabled a significant number of Russian citizens — mostly from economically vulnerable backgrounds, rural areas, and small towns — to earn incomes eight to ten times higher than their pre-war wages. For many of these individuals, returning to a labor market offering salaries of 30,000–40,000 rubles a month appears virtually impossible. This creates fertile ground for criminal involvement as a means to maintain their accustomed level of consumption, Maslov writes.
Political Fallout: Veterans as a Force Beyond State Control
From a policy perspective, experts argue that the government should reconsider plans to increase direct payments to SMO participants. Instead, motivation should be maintained through alternative incentives — such as opportunities for upward mobility within state structures or positions in controlled paramilitary or administrative bodies.
While regional governments claim to have established psychological support systems for veterans, in practice, such services reach no more than 10% of those in need. Existing employment programs are primarily geared toward disabled or seriously wounded veterans, not the tens of thousands of healthy men returning from the battlefield.
Local civil infrastructure is woefully unprepared to manage the integration of demobilized soldiers — whether socially, economically, or politically. Promises to include veterans in governance structures remain mostly rhetorical, as mass-scale integration appears unfeasible.
Alongside the risks of criminalization, experts also warn of the potential for political mobilization of veterans, particularly in the form of ultranationalist movements such as the “Russian Communities.” These grassroots structures carry not only far-right ideological content but also a potentially anti-government character, especially in a climate of social frustration and marginalization.
As one expert puts it:
“We’re already seeing that Wagner, even after Prigozhin’s death, has retained its horizontal social communication network. After broad demobilization, we can expect similar — but larger-scale — networks to emerge. Veterans will become a recruitment base for revanchist and far-right forces that are poised to exert serious influence on the country’s political climate.”
Aware of these threats, the Russian government is deliberately avoiding rapid demobilization. The current course is toward a phased, multi-year reintegration of SMO participants into civilian life. Proposed measures include long-term military contracts and the settlement of veterans in Russia’s “new regions,” where they would serve as both a stabilizing social presence and an auxiliary force.
