By Andrei Kalitin, host of the TV program “Top Secret”
In May of this year, several Russian expert centers abroad released their visions of the future by presenting reform projects for a “post-Putin Russia.” The nearly simultaneous publication of these reports on various platforms opposed to the Kremlin does not indicate any real consolidation of analytical efforts.
Rather, these “May Programs” suggest a shift in focus among opposition centers—from trying to mobilize and unify Russia’s domestic democratic, anti-war, and anti-Putin forces, to planning how they will act when, under as-yet-unknown political or other circumstances, the regime “lets power slip from its hands” and a “window of opportunity” opens during a transitional period.
Analysts from the Re:Russia project estimate that there are currently at least six independent initiatives outlining transformation programs designed to be launched on “Day X.” Among them, at least four have generated broad public discussion.
One such initiative was announced by the Expert Forum, held in Vilnius by Yulia Navalnaya. A conceptually coherent contribution came from the Transit project, as well as from a report prepared by the legal experts of the Memorial Human Rights Center, titled “100 Days After Putin: A Transitional Government Action Package.” Meanwhile, economist Vladislav Inozemtsev presented his vision of a “Common European Home” in Brussels, arguing that postwar Russia should be welcomed back into Europe.
All of these initiatives—unified under the informal heading “After”—propose radical reforms. For instance, one of the core proposals in the “100 Days” report is the lustration of Russia’s security services, a process that is hard to imagine being implemented under current conditions. According to some outside observers, these publications may partly function as a kind of “antidepressant,” unable to substitute for the hard work of structuring a broad political coalition—something the opposition has so far failed to achieve.
Russia’s official political institutions have chosen to ignore these publications entirely, not even bothering to criticize them. However, even the authors themselves admit that reforming Russia “after Putin” is unlikely to be completed within 100 days, and will more likely take decades.
Nevertheless, the very appearance of such reform programs and the public debate they have sparked is highly significant.
First, opposition centers have countered the frequent accusation that they lack concrete reform agendas. By discussing the country’s future—not merely criticizing the Kremlin—they are attempting to build a serious reform narrative.
Second, there is no public discourse on the future inside Russia itself. Political life has been extinguished, there is no competition of ideas, and political parties have become little more than administrative subsidiaries.
Third, the Russian administration itself no longer speaks of the future. Instead, it is consumed with constructing an ideological narrative rooted in historical military victories “from the time of Ochakov and the conquest of Crimea.”
A conversation about the future of the country is urgently needed right now. To dismiss or ignore these early sprouts of debate is a grave mistake. It is far from certain that the people currently drafting reform projects will be the ones to shape Russia’s future. But the very existence of this work offers a glimmer of hope that such a future still exists.
