A segment of the Russian oligarchic class—those whose assets privatized during the 1990s are now vulnerable to potential nationalization—continues to wage unsuccessful legal battles in European courts, seeking relief from sanctions.
Favorable rulings are crucial for these individuals to preserve a financial fallback outside Russia and to retain access to billions in foreign currency assets accumulated through the exploitation of the country’s natural and labor resources. However, recent decisions from European courts suggest that the chances of unfreezing such assets are virtually nil. Claims of dissociation from “Putin’s regime” and public anti-war declarations condemning the war in Ukraine (SVO) have failed to persuade the courts.
Melnichenko’s Defeat and the Timchenko Precedent
One recent case involves UAE resident Andrey Melnichenko, who suffered a major defeat in a British court. His claim to recover €280 million under six bonds issued by two financial groups on behalf of EuroChem North-West—intended for the second phase of an ammonia production facility in Kingisepp—was rejected in full. The High Court of Justice ruled that Melnichenko is the ultimate beneficiary of the deal and cited five additional grounds for dismissal.
On August 1, the EU Court of Justice rejected an appeal by Gennady and Elena Timchenko challenging the denial of their request to lift EU sanctions. Notably, the appellate decision emphasized that “whether or not the applicants’ activities within the Timchenko Foundation are related to the situation in Ukraine has no legal significance, and the lower court was under no obligation to explain how and to what extent sanctions imposed on the applicants further the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy objectives.” In effect, the court clarified that no matter what pro-Ukrainian actions the applicants might undertake, such behavior would carry no legal weight in the context of sanctions.
This ruling sends a troubling signal to other sanctioned oligarchs—such as Mikhail Fridman, Petr Aven, and others—who have attempted to improve their standing in European courts by offering assistance to Ukraine or the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU).
New Risks for Abramovich and Shvidler as Legal Doors Close
In a precedent-setting statement, the EU court also noted that “the absence of official positions at Bank Rossiya does not demonstrate Gennady Timchenko’s distancing from Russia’s senior decision-makers.” This formulation may seriously undermine the prospects of a new case filed by Roman Abramovich, who is challenging the extension of his inclusion on the EU sanctions list (case T-359/25). Particularly notable is Abramovich’s latest argument, made public on July 29 by the EU Court’s registry: he claims that “by its actions, the defendant [the EU court] has humiliated the human dignity of the claimant.” Abramovich must now, under adversarial legal procedure, provide evidence defining the parameters of his human dignity and the extent to which the EU has allegedly violated them.
Meanwhile, Abramovich’s close associate and business partner, Evgeny Shvidler, has definitively lost his legal bid to escape UK sanctions. On July 29, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom dismissed Shvidler’s appeal by a majority vote. He had challenged the legality and proportionality of his inclusion on the sanctions list under Regulation 855.
The cumulative effect of these legal defeats in Europe may set the stage for renewed action by Russia’s Prosecutor General’s Office. Authorities could soon examine whether the activities of those who control the country’s largest privatized industrial assets align with national interests. Precedents involving assets such as Domodedovo Airport, the Southern Generating Company (UGC), and others provide a clear and well-trodden path for such reviews.
