While official Moscow continues to project an image of unity and resilience, behind the scenes, disturbing and strikingly candid assessments are emerging. Some Kremlin-affiliated foreign policy experts — including influential figures like Fyodor Lukyanov and Sergey Karaganov — are daring to speak openly about problems that are taboo in the official discourse. Their remarks at a recent meeting of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy suggest that even within the regime’s loyal circles, there is a growing awareness that the country has reached an impasse.
“With the current economic model, we will win neither the war nor the peace that follows,”
states one of the discussion protocols.
Such a statement would typically come from opposition analysts. But in this case, it was made at a closed-door meeting hosted by a Kremlin-aligned think tank. According to participants, Russia’s economic policy is leading toward recession, and key misjudgments — particularly in underestimating the enemy and lagging in defense technology — have become a recurring problem.
Disillusionment Behind the Façade
Russian officials continue to promote a narrative of a united nation on the verge of victory. Yet, as participants of the council point out, beneath this glossy image lie fatigue, frustration, and deep internal division. According to NZZ, this acknowledgment is particularly significant because it comes from those who help shape the Kremlin’s strategic outlook.
Despite President Putin’s constant claims of “national consolidation,” the discussion revealed that real societal mobilization never occurred during the three years of war. Moreover, different segments of the population lack any shared vision of the postwar future. Experts speak plainly: society is psychologically exhausted — and this exhaustion did not begin with the so-called “special military operation” or even the pandemic, but with the constitutional reform that allowed Putin to reset his term limits.
That reform, they argue, extinguished hopes for political change in much of the population.
A Fractured Society and False Expectations
Russian society has split into two parallel worlds: those who are fighting at the front or connected to it, and those insulated from the war who continue to live normal lives. This social fracture, the experts warn, is deepening. Soldiers and their families feel alienated, while the rest of the population remains immersed in a “pre-victory euphoria” perpetuated by the media.
But this, the discussion protocol warns, is an illusion.
“There are no signs of an imminent end to the war at the front, and diplomatic maneuvers only create false hope,” they say.
Even if combat operations cease, the conflict with the West will continue in other forms. War coverage in the media presents a sanitized version of reality.
The expectation of a quick victory is also straining the efforts of volunteers who support the military effort on their own initiative. Aid is dwindling. Volunteers who once provided camouflage nets, socks, drones, protective gear, food, and hygiene supplies are now becoming disillusioned.
The state, meanwhile, has a conflicted relationship with these grassroots initiatives. On the one hand, it benefits from their contributions; on the other, it fears the uncontrolled, horizontal networks they represent. In the council’s discussion, these volunteer networks are bluntly described as a major risk — not because of ideology, but because they operate outside the state’s control.
Ukraine as a Permanent Threat
How should Russia deal with the outside world? From the council’s discussion emerges a clear admission: for years, Russia has struggled to wield soft power effectively. Relying on economic interdependence has proven futile — the case of Ukraine, once tightly integrated with Russia’s economy, is cited as a stark example.
Looking ahead, the council holds no illusions about Russia’s future relationship with its neighbor. Even under the most favorable outcome of the “special operation,” Ukraine will remain a long-term threat and a source of instability.
The experts also voice concern over Russia’s dwindling influence in the broader post-Soviet space. Soviet nostalgia and the shared memory of the 1945 victory still resonate, but the generations that remember are dying out. Symbolism is no longer enough.
“Love for the Soviet motherland doesn’t replace laptops for schoolchildren — and Turkey can give them those too,”
the report notes sharply.
The document adds a sobering criticism of Russian domestic policy: it is hypocritical to preach “brotherhood among peoples” while denying education to the children of migrants from these same nations.
The Kremlin Is Not a Monolith
Although the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy lacks formal power, its statements are revealing. In a time when any deviation from the official narrative is met with suspicion, the emergence of such honest commentary is significant.
As NZZ points out, these discussions reveal a key truth: even within the pro-Kremlin elite, there is no real unity. Those who are loyal to the regime still understand that adaptability is essential to survival. Maintaining power requires confronting uncomfortable truths — not just issuing triumphant proclamations.
And that’s what makes these internal discussions so important. Russia, its own strategists admit, is losing resources, support, influence, and internal cohesion. Without a serious course correction, even those loyal to the Kremlin are beginning to concede: the system might not hold.
This article was prepared based on materials published by Neue Zürcher Zeitung. The author does not claim authorship of the original text but presents their interpretation of the content for informational purposes.
The original article can be found at the following link: Neue Zürcher Zeitung.
All rights to the original text belong to Neue Zürcher Zeitung.
