Under mounting external pressure — including the efforts of international mediators — the first direct talks in three years between representatives of Russia and Ukraine may take place this Thursday. Yet against the backdrop of ongoing war, bloodshed, and mutual distrust, the very idea of negotiations seems more like a diplomatic illusion than a realistic prospect. As noted by the Swiss newspaper Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ), both sides approach this potential dialogue burdened by a heavy legacy of historical grievances, broken promises, and failed agreements. In such conditions, merely agreeing to talk is already an achievement.
The last visit by a Ukrainian president to the Kremlin took place in December 2013, when Viktor Yanukovych arrived in Moscow amid the Euromaidan protests in Kyiv. Vladimir Putin at the time called Ukraine a “strategic partner and ally” and offered financial support. Just weeks later, Yanukovych fled the country, triggering a rift between the two nations that would escalate into the annexation of Crimea, war in Donbas, and eventually Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022.
Since then, direct contact between the two leaders has been rare. The only face-to-face meeting between Volodymyr Zelensky and Vladimir Putin occurred in Paris in December 2019. Their last phone conversation was in July 2020. All other attempts at dialogue have gone through intermediaries — usually without results.
Why Talks Are Impossible Without Trust
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine and Russia have signed multiple bilateral agreements — most of which were either ignored or violated at critical moments. As NZZ highlights, the erosion of trust has become systemic. Today, this lack of mutual confidence remains the main obstacle to meaningful peace talks.
Even when both sides publicly express readiness to negotiate, it remains unclear what exactly they should be negotiating about. Their respective goals and expectations are so far apart that a major diplomatic effort would be needed just to establish a basic framework for discussion. The United States has tried and failed to do this — even in Washington, officials admit that the Kremlin is demanding too much.
At the core of Russia’s demands are not just territorial claims but a call to overhaul the entire European security architecture. Putin wants the outcomes of 1989–1991 to be recalibrated in Russia’s favor. He also insists on a “neutral” Ukraine, effectively aligned with Russia both politically and militarily.
Ukraine, however, drawing on its bitter experience with the Minsk agreements, sees no sincerity in such assurances. And it certainly does not view Moscow as a neutral negotiating partner.
The Minsk Agreements: A Symbol of Failure and Manipulation
The Minsk agreements, signed in 2014 and 2015 with mediation from Germany, France, and the OSCE, were intended as a roadmap to a ceasefire in Donbas and a political settlement. But even then, the structure was flawed. Russia posed as a mediator while effectively controlling separatist forces in eastern Ukraine — undermining the legitimacy of the entire process from Kyiv’s point of view.
The documents called for a series of mutual concessions — from amnesty to special status for Donbas — but implementation required a level of trust that simply wasn’t there. The guns never fell silent, the negotiations stalled, and the political track never began in earnest. Ukraine accused Moscow of sabotage; Russia, in turn, blamed Kyiv for its unwillingness to compromise.
As NZZ notes, Minsk became a source of mutual frustration rather than a path to peace. Russia lost faith in European mediators, accusing Berlin, Paris, and the OSCE of bias. Ukraine, meanwhile, saw Minsk as a tool of pressure, not a mechanism for resolution. And this logic persists: today, Moscow continues to use negotiations as political cover for military aggression. The Kremlin refuses any ceasefire before talks, preferring to maintain its position of force.
Istanbul 2022: Not a Precedent, but a Cautionary Tale
In the spring of 2022, a new glimmer of hope appeared during talks in Istanbul. Putin still refers to that round as a potential foundation for future agreement. Yet, as NZZ stresses, no real deal was ever signed. What existed was a draft — a framework filled with unresolved core issues.
Ukraine showed some flexibility, signaling openness to a neutral status. But it categorically rejected demands for drastic cuts to its military, constitutional amendments, and other measures that would undermine sovereignty. No consensus was reached regarding Western security guarantees — a crucial component for any lasting peace.
Moreover, key actors such as the EU and the UN Security Council were absent from those negotiations, robbing the process of broader legitimacy. There was also no synchrony between short-term goals (like a ceasefire) and long-term objectives (such as a new European security framework).
As political analyst Samuel Charap and historian Sergey Radchenko recently wrote in Foreign Affairs, successful negotiations require both sides to view peace talks as preferable to continued war. That condition is clearly not met today — especially not by Moscow.
On the contrary, Russia seems to be relying once again on its old tactic: using military pressure in tandem with diplomatic rhetoric. Negotiations do not replace warfare; they merely accompany it. That is why the Kremlin insists on continuing the offensive until a deal is signed — to secure leverage at the table.
Politics, Elections, and the Illusion of Peace
Zelensky and Putin’s current rhetorical openness to dialogue appears to stem less from a genuine desire for compromise and more from political calculation. Analysts suggest both leaders are positioning themselves ahead of the U.S. presidential election — particularly in anticipation of Donald Trump’s possible return, as Moscow traditionally views him as a more favorable interlocutor.
Yet even if talks begin, the road to any real agreement will be long and arduous. It would need ratification in both Kyiv and Moscow, endorsement by European powers, and approval from the UN Security Council. And even then, peace is far from guaranteed. Ukraine, based on its prior experience, assumes that any deal could eventually be broken by Russia once it becomes inconvenient.
That is why, as NZZ concludes, despite the public posturing, both sides continue to trust weapons more than words. In such an atmosphere, talk of peace remains largely rhetorical — not a roadmap, but a mirage.
This article was prepared based on materials published by Neue Zürcher Zeitung. The author does not claim authorship of the original text but presents their interpretation of the content for informational purposes.
The original article can be found at the following link: Neue Zürcher Zeitung.
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