Hopes for peace are gradually fading in Russian society. After a springtime surge in expectations tied to Easter, May 9 celebrations, talks in Turkey and Saudi Arabia, and high-level discussions, public sentiment is once again reverting to the belief that the “special military operation” (SVO) is here to stay — and likely for a long time.
According to a source familiar with the latest polling data, the strongest wave of peace-related optimism occurred in February and March, followed by a more modest uptick in May. But today, that momentum is clearly waning: while people continue to hope, fewer actually believe.
“Hopes haven’t completely dried up yet, but they’re clearly on the decline,” the source noted.
At the same time, a different belief is rising to the forefront: that the war won’t end through negotiations, but through the exhaustion of Ukraine. The notion that “Ukraine will soon run out of weapons — and then we’ll finish the job” is gaining traction. Traditionally championed by hardliners, this view is now being adopted even by those who once believed that if the war had started, it should at least be seen through to the end.
The idea that the SVO could end in a catastrophe for Russia, meanwhile, is practically nonexistent. Pollsters report that such fears are within the margin of error. The dominant pattern of hope, the source says, remains simple and absolute: “Russia cannot lose.”
In the coming months, the public’s desire for peace is expected to drop even further — even as the Russian government continues to speak publicly about the possibility of negotiations. In fact, the negotiation narrative will likely be maintained through targeted information campaigns:
“There will be enough fodder to feed the doves, but the overall public mood will keep shifting in a different direction. People have learned to live under the conditions of an ‘eternal SVO’.”
Experts believe that serious negotiations may resume in the fall. For now, the summer is expected to be marked by a new Russian offensive — one that, as insiders suggest, is intended to deliver a “psychological boost” to public morale.
This “adjustment in sentiment” is already having an impact, including on volunteer recruitment. While there are currently no major issues with attracting volunteers, significant increases in regional payouts are unlikely. Instead, a different — more pragmatic — resource is being tapped: material need.
“We see that for 8–10% of Russians, financial conditions have improved in recent months, while for 17–20%, they’ve worsened. That’s the real foundation of the mobilization resource,” the source explained.
The social status of SVO participants has risen, the benefits are tangible, and for many, joining the war has become a practical solution to urgent problems: debt, unemployment, and a lack of money.
The “last train effect” — when people rushed to enlist in hopes of short-term gain — has mostly run its course. Now, volunteers view the situation differently.
“Everyone understands now — this war could drag on for six months, a year, or even longer,” the source concluded.
